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ANTITRUST: TRADE ASSOCIATION'S REFUSAL TO
DEAL HELD A PER SE VIOLATION
THE CONCLUSIVE presumption of illegality of group boycotts under
the Sherman Act has recently been strengthened by Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,' where the per se doctrine was
applied to a trade association's refusal to deal.
A manufacturer of gas burners brought an action under Sections 42
and 16- of the Clayton Act alleging that the American Gas Association
(AGA) and several of its members4 were conspiring to restrain trade in
violation of Section ir of the Sherman Act. AGA operated testing
laboratories, affixing a "seal of approval" on all gas appliances meeting
its standards. Claiming that those standards were not objective and
that AGA's determinations were made capriciously, the plaintiff asserted
that its burner, although safer and more efficient than ones previously
approved by AGA, was refused approval. The plaintiff further alleged
that AGA's purpose of controlling the market was ultimately effectuated
by the member utility companies' refusing to provide gas for use in
-burners not approved by AGA, thus effectively excluding its burner
from the market.
The district court dismissed on the ground that the complaint failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of
Appeals affirmed,' holding that no per se violation was established and
that in the absence of a per se violation, "public injury" must be alleged.
The court found that the plaintiff had failed to allege "public injury"
1 364 U.S. 656 (196x).
"Any person who shall be injured . . .by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court .. . and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained . . . ." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
" 'Any person . . .shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief ... against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws .... " 38 Stat. 737
6914), 15 U.S.C. § z6 (1958).
'The members of AGA joined as defendants were two public utility companies en-
gaged in the distribution of gas, two pipeline companies engaged in the transportation of
natural gas, and six manufacturers of gas burners.
"Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal .... " 26 Stat. 209
(1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (958).
0 273 F.zd 196 (7th Cir. s959). -
Vol. 1961: 302] REFUSAL TO DEAL 303
because the complaint did not show "any appreciable lessening" in the
sale of conversion gas burners or gas furnaces or that the public had
been deprived of a product of over-all superiority.7 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that refusal to sell consumers gas for use in burners
not approved by AGA was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Although the language of the Sherman Act is all-inclusive,' the lead-
ing case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States' established the principle
that only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited. This re-
strictive interpretation of the statute is now commonly referred to as the
"rule of reason." Under this approach, the restraint must be evaluated
in terms of its nature, purpose, and effects within the context of the
specific commercial situation.10
The per se doctrine developed as an expedient substitute for the
detailed inquiries involved in a rule of reason approach. Certain re-
straints by their very "nature" and "character" have been conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable. 1 The Court looks only to the act itself,
concluding ipso facto that it cannot be justified and probably will be
repeated in the future. Thus, even if only an insubstantial amount of
trade is immediately restrained, the Court finds a "monopolistic tend-
ency"' 2 within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.' 3  Since unreason-
'Id. at zoo.
' The Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade.
°221 U.S. I (1911).
10 Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of the rule of reason approach is that
made by the Supreme Court in Board of Trade v. United States: "IIT]he court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restaint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposedi the nature of the restraint and
its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences." 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). For
similar statements of the relevant inquiries, see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 6x5 (i953) ; United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495, 527 (1948).
"See, e.g., Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(group boycott) 5 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying
arrangement); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (jrice-
fixing).
"E.g., Klorls, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra note' I at 2131i Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 39z3396 (947).- +
" In discussing the common law prohibitions against restraints of trade which the
Sherman Act was held to include, the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 2zt
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ableness is presumed, the plaintiff need only establish the alleged op-
erative acts plus injury to himself. 4
Although the Supreme Court had often utilized the per se doctrine
in situations involving concerted refusals to deal, 5 lower courts" and
commentators17 questioned the applicability of such a rule to all cases.'8
U.S. 1, 57 (1gi), said that "contracts or acts which it was considered had a monopo-
listic tendency . . . came also in a generic sense to be spoken of . . . as restricting the
due course of trade, and therefore as being in restraint of trade." See Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 6z3 (x953) (monopolistic designs as
well as results reached by the prohibitions of the Sherman Act). The underlying
rationale was expressed by the Court in Swift & Co. v. United States: "Where acts
are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent ...
an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability
that it will happen. . . . But when that intent and the consequent dangerous proba-
bility exist, this statute . . . directs itself against that dangerous probability as well as
against the completed result." 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
"Thus, in the Radizt Burners case it would seem that proof of the agreement
not to supply gas for use in burners not approved by AGA and resulting injury will
entitle the plaintiff to recover. The defendants will not be allowed the defense that
their refusal to sell was justified and based upon reasonable standards. Nor will the
plaintiff be required to prove that his burner was safe or that the defendants' purpose
was to control the market.
1See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(194) ; Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) ; Binderup v. Pathe
Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923)5 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 6oo (914). In none of these cases did the Court make it clear
whether the unreasonableness was due to the surrounding circumstances or to the
adoption of a boycott in and of itself. For instance, in the Fashion Originators' Guild
case, although exclusion of evidence as to the reasonableness of the boycott was upheld,
the Court discussed at length the economic effects of the boycott on the market and thus
may have felt that these effects were sufficiently unreasonable to preclude any justification.
In addition to the cases specifically dealing with group boycotts, dicta in others
have categorized boycotts as illegal per se. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
522 (1948).
1"See, e.g., Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195
F.2d 86 (7 th Cir. 1952)5 Butterick Publishing Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.
2936) i United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Supp. 9x5 (E.D. La. 1957) ;
'United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
17 See, e.g., Handler, Annual Review of Recent Antitrust Developnents, 12 RECORD
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 4ii (1957); Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust
-Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1955)i Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation:
Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MicK. L. REV. 139 (1952).
" In earlier cases the Supreme Court had applied a standard of reasonableness to
some group refusals to deal. In Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898),
members of a cattle exchange had agreed not to deal with any non-member trader.
The Court upheld this boycott because the amount of trade affected was insubstantiail
and the exchange's purpose was to. foster an organized market, thus promoting rather
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Then, in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,i9 the Court held
that a complaint alleging a refusal by maj or manufacturers to sell their
electrical appliances to an individual retailer established a per se viola-
tion and that the defendants' affidavits as to the reasonableness of the
restraint were no defense. Rather than restrict its holding to those
combinations whose singular purpose is to eliminate competition, the
Court went further and stated in unqualified terms that group boycotts
and combined refusals to deal are per se illegal. 0
The instant case, dealing with activities of a trade association,
afforded the Court an opportunity to delimit the scope of the Klor's
rule for unlike the purpose of the combination in that case, AGA's
objectives went beyond the mere elimination of competition, and some
justification could be offered in defense of its activities. Nevertheless,
rather than remand for application of a rule of reason test, 21 the Court
than obstructing commerce. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, Z88 U.S. 344
(x933)
, 
dealt with the adoption by competing coal producers of a common selling
agent. Since the coal industry was in distress and the plan had not yet been put into
effect, the Court found no "monopolistic menace" and upheld the restraint as reasonable
under the circumstances; it was suggested that new proceedings could be initiated if
adverse effects upon competition should develop from actual operation of the program.
2 359 U.S. 207 (950).
O Id. at 212. Most commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with the ali-
encompassing prohibition laid down by the Klor's case. See, e.g., Handler, Recent
Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 84.3 (iqs) ; Rahl,
Per Se Rides and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's
Case, 45 VA. L. Ray. ix65 (1959). A recent district court case, United States v.
Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 196o), held that in absence
of coercive economic pressure, a group refusal to deal is to be tested under the rule of
reason. This decision seems inconsistent with Klor's.
2- The Court of Appeal's requirement of "public injury," in the sense of appreciable
lessening in the sale of gas burners or depriving the public of a product of over-all
superiority, would seem to be inconsistent with Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445 (x957)- In that case the lower court had dismissed a complaint for
failure to allege "public injury." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a com-
plaint in a treble damage suit "need only be 'tested under the Sherman Act's general
prohibition on unreasonable restraints of trade' . . . . Congress has, by legislative fiat,
determined that such prohibited activities are injurious to the public . . . . [T]his
Court should not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is
specifically set forth by Congress . . . ." 352 U.S. at 453-54. On a motion to dis-
miss, the complaint should be liberally construed and all reasonable inferences of fact
drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See iA BARRON & HoLToFF, FEDERAL PRACTrcE AND,
PROCEDURE § 255 (rev. ed. 596o). Thus, it would be seem that the complaint in the
instant case had sufficiently alleged facts from which a "monopolistic tendency" could
be found. See note 14 supra.
Even under the appellate court's narrow concept of "public injury," plaintiff's
allegation that his burner was safer and more efficient than those previously approved
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chose instead to reaffirm the blanket prohibition laid down by Klor's,
thereby discarding justification and good motive as possible limitations
to the per se doctrine as applied to group refusals to deal. The Court
has thus made it dear that even trade associations, regardless of their
raison d'gtre and reasonable standards, may not effectuate their policies
through refusals to deal.22
The Court's restrictive attitude toward trade association activities is
based on valid policy considerations. Free market access is essential to
an effective competitive order.2 Therefore, no group should be allowed
to foreclose the market to any competitor. The public, not a private
group, should make the ultimate decision as to whether a product is
worthy to compete. Protection of the public from dangerous products
and protection of business from trade abuses are governmental func-
tions not to be entrusted to an unregulated private group.24
On the other hand, it cannot be expected that the Government will
regulate all fields of economic activity in need of some form of control.
Therefore, a restricted degree of cooperative trade activity should be
by the AGA should have satisfied, for purposes of withstanding a motion to dismiss,
the requirement of alleging that the public had been deprived of a product of over-
all superiority.
"By placing its emphasis on the refusal to sell, the Court avoided the necessity of
considering the legality of the defendants' refusal to grant plaintiff's burner a seal of
approval. The confidence placed by the public in seals of approval, such as those given
by the Consumers' Research Institute and the Good Housekeeping Institute, undoubtedly
has some effect on the marketability of nonapproved products. Whether or not an
unreasonable refusal to grant approval in and of itself will be subject to condemnatlons
under the Sherman Act will have to be decided in future cases.
23 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNFY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 326 (1955): "From the economic point of view, relative free-
dom of opportunity for entry of new rivals is a fundamental requisite for effective
competition in the long run." See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 396 (1947)5 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13-14 (s945)
Barber, supra note 17-
"See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. x (1945); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 32 U.S. 457 (194i). In the Associated Press case
the Court characterized the combination in question as an "extra-governmental agency,
which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and
provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and
thus 'trenches upon the power of the national legislature .. . .' " 326 U.S. at 19. But
compare the dictum of Chief Justice Hughes in Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States,
297 U.S. 553, 598 (936): "[The Sherman Act prohibitions] do not prevent the
adoption of reasonable means to protect interstate commerce from destructive or in-
jurious practices and to promote competition upon a sound basis. Voluntary action to
end abuses and to foster fair competitive opportunities in the public interest may be
more effective than legal processes."
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allowed and a competitor alleging injury as a result of such activities
should be required to prove that the particular conduct complained of
was "unreasonable." Thus, a rule of reason standard applied to the
Sherman Act, complemented by state tort remedies,25 should provide
adequate protection against any abuse of the association's regulatory
powers.
Perhaps the greatest danger of applying a per se rule to trade
associations is that fear of treble damage actions may discourage many
economically and socially desirable group self-betterment activities.
Often, associations' rules, by improving trade standards, will benefit
both the trade and the public. In the instant case the defendants were
prepared to justify their activities on the ground that public reaction
to appliance failures reduced the market for gas appliances and conse-
quently for gas itself. Self-imposed restrictions as to manufacturing
standards thus could provide the public with more dependable appli-
ances and, by encouraging public acceptance of gas appliances, benefit all
segments of the gas industry.2 These positive functions of trade associa-
tions should not be overlooked when evaluating the wisdom of applying
a rule of per se illegality. 27
In addition, since many trade associations have no monopolistic
intent, it will not be true that all of their refusals to deal will have the
1'monopolistic tendency" which a per se holding presumes. Given
reasonable standards and a purpose consistent with maintainance of
competition, an association's refusal to deal may cause no harm, actual
or potential, to the competitive process. Yet the per se rule, focusing
solely upon the act itself, disregards standards, intent, and demonstrable
consequences and thus presumes an effect on competition not present in
all cases. Since the per se presumption is not consistent with the actual
social and economic consequences of many trade associations' refusals
to deal, a finding of unreasonableness should be made only after the
deeper inquiry afforded under the rule of reason.
" For possible tort remedies, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 765-777 (939).
Concerted refusals to deal are actionable torts unless justified. The factors considered
on the issue of justification are essentially those considered under a rule of reason
approach to the Sherman Act. See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 765(z) (939).
-o Brief for Respondents, pp. 24-25.
'See Oppenheim, suipra note 17, at 1171-75. After discussing the need for co-
operative endeavors among competitors, Oppenheim suggests that "the underlying
problem of delimiting the appropriate 'functional area of cooperative action, in
harmony with the objectives of the federal anti-trust laws present issues of public
policy on which the guiding yardstick of the Rule of Reason offers the best prospects of
solution." Oppenheim, supra note 17, at 1172.
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